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1 Introduction
In this debate, I am the Grinch. I argue that
developing countries (especially those with high-
prevalence generalised AIDS epidemics) cannot
support the welfare needs of children affected by
AIDS. There are two reasons. First, countries that
attempt this task risk undermining their capacity for
economic growth. Growth failure will affect their
ability to sustain any assistance they may already be
providing to children affected by AIDS. Second, these
countries also face other development challenges.
Assisting children and adults who are hungry,
illiterate, ill, displaced, or otherwise destitute is no
less compelling – economically or financially – than
supporting children affected by AIDS.
My arguments reflect concerns about efficiency and
(horizontal) equity. Neither principle excludes
providing some (modest) assistance to children
affected by AIDS as part of broader support to the
disadvantaged. That support, however, can only be
sustained if countries avoid distorting their economies
by giving exaggerated attention to specific problems.
The article is organised as follows. It first examines
why poor countries should focus on efficiency and
equity. It then argues that no developing country
should devote all the resources it can muster to
children affected by AIDS (or any other single
development issue). Section three examines the
consequences of having the donors provide the
necessary resources. Data from Zambia are used to
anchor the arguments but the conclusions hold
equally well throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
2 Why are efficiency and (horizontal) equity
relevant to this debate?
Efficiency is fundamental in economics. To economise
is to be efficient (i.e. avoid waste). Allocating large
amounts of resources to meet the needs of one
specific group is inefficient and reallocating some of
those resources to other purposes would raise
national income and welfare. Being poor, developing
countries have the least ability to sustain waste.
Government policies that promote efficiency boost
the rate of economic growth, raising the welfare of
the whole population. Public activities that are
inefficient and government policies that generate
waste have the opposite effect.
Horizontal equity involves the equal treatment of
members of any society who are in (roughly) similar
circumstances. This principle highlights the question:
if a developing country decides to fully support the
welfare needs of children affected by AIDS, what
responsibility does it have for the needs of other
citizens who are hungry, poorly educated, ill,
displaced, and/or marginalised? Who decides and
why it is essential to respond to the deprivation of
one group and not others? Emphasising horizontal
equity encourages activities that, within the limits of
the nation’s capabilities, address deprivation
irrespective of its source.
Resolving issues related to efficiency and equity is
never easy. Decision-makers differ on the relative
importance of these and other social, political and
economic issues. Yet, since all resources are scarce,
how decision-makers allocate resources always has
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efficiency and equity effects. Pretending otherwise
does not help.1 It is the same even when the
international community provides the resources. The
only change is the nature of the choices.2
Ample evidence is available. Consider the
development trajectories in Asia and Africa over the
last five decades. In the former, rapid economic
growth and social development lifted several hundred
million people out of poverty. In the latter, the lack of
these has driven as many as 200 million people
deeper into poverty. Much of the difference in
performance between the two regions can be related
to the choices made by the various governments as
they mobilised and allocated their resources.
The example of Zambia illustrates what is involved in
supporting the welfare needs of children affected by
AIDS. It has a high-prevalence generalised AIDS
epidemic. It is receiving extraordinary levels of
assistance from the US President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Global Fund, the
World Bank, UNAIDS, numerous NGOs and several
bilateral assistance agencies. Data are presented for
2005, when Zambia’s population was 11.5 million,
growing at 2.2 per cent per annum. The HIV
prevalence among adults was 17 per cent, an
estimated 98,000 people died of AIDS, the number
of children and adults living with HIV was around
1.1 million, and the number of AIDS orphans was
estimated to be 710,000.3 Forty-six per cent of the
population was aged 0–15 years.4 The total value of
goods and services produced (i.e. the country’s GDP)
was US$6.93 billion.5 Average per capita income was
around US$600 or roughly US$900 when adjusted
for international purchasing power (PPP). Due to the
skewed distribution of national income,6 64 per cent
of Zambia’s population had expenditure below the
PPP-adjusted benchmark of ‘$1 a day’ and 87 per cent
below $2/day. During 2005, GDP grew by 4.3 per
cent.
Can Zambia support the welfare needs of children
affected by AIDS?7 The majority of Zambian children
are affected by AIDS and to set a number, it will be
assumed here that 3 million children, slightly below
60 per cent, are affected by AIDS. These children
need primary healthcare, education and social
welfare. What level of expenditure would support
those needs? Cost estimates vary from several
hundred dollars to a few thousand per child per year.
One benchmark (again to set a number) is the
poverty line of $2/day, equivalent to $2.65/day in
2005 prices, or US$1,060 per year.8 Using the
equivalent of ‘$1 a day’ would halve the cost. This,
however, is the international limit for ‘absolute
poverty’ and it hardly seems consistent to argue that
governments are meeting children’s welfare needs if
the support provided keeps them in absolute poverty.
The estimates below use US$1,000 per child per
year or US$3 billion in total.
In 2005, this US$3 billion, was equivalent to 43 per
cent of GDP, 51 per cent of total (public and private)
consumption expenditure, 163 per cent of total
government expenditure, 145 per cent of total
imports of goods and services, and 620 per cent of
international grants provided to the government.
This is a large amount, both absolutely and relatively.
3 Why not devote all available resources to
children affected by AIDS?
Suppose governments in countries with generalised
AIDS epidemics and their donors acknowledge that
although efficiency and equity are important, the
welfare needs of children affected by AIDS have to
be met? Why should anyone object? Two reasons
stand out.
First, no developing country in such circumstances
could raise the required resources. As mentioned, in
2005, Zambia would have required at least
US$3 billion to ensure that 3 million children were
supported at a level that is close to (but below) the
international poverty standard of $2/day. In that year,
the government budget was equivalent to 26 per
cent of GDP. With Zambia having run a budget
deficit continuously since 1974,9 and thereby
accumulated unserviceable debts,10 the required
resources will have to come entirely from the
international community. Furthermore, roughly the
same amount of US$3 billion (adjusted for inflation)
will need to be spent in each subsequent year while
the epidemic persists and children continue to be
affected by AIDS. Zambia lacks financial capacity
(whether measured as fiscal space or
creditworthiness) to sustain this.
Second, by deciding to support children affected by
AIDS, the government would be unable to also
meet other pressing needs, exacerbating illiteracy,
food insecurity, inadequate infrastructure, ill-health,
unemployment and rural poverty (among others).
Thus, even if no one objected to the policy of fully
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supporting children affected by AIDS, it could not
succeed. The distortions created by neglecting other
dimensions of deprivation would increase poverty
and intensify marginalisation. Short of war, persistent
economic distortions are the most potent income-
reducing and wealth-destroying mechanisms yet
devised. Children affected by AIDS would not enjoy
sustained benefits if the activities that support them
undercut the economy.
4 What if others provide the required resources?
Suppose the international community provide all the
resources (commodities, finance, technical assistance)
required for children affected by AIDS? There are two
difficulties. First, the resource flows required are
significantly larger than any the international
community has ever attempted to provide to a single
country. The US$3 billion for Zambia in 2005 noted
above is more than six times greater than total cash
grants received in that year. Second, even if the
international community were to provide the necessary
finance, the local resources required – human and
physical capital, institutional and organisational
capacities, knowledge, and transparent governance
structures – could not be scaled-up commensurately.11
A lesson that poor countries (especially those in Africa)
can learn from Asian development experience is that
knowing when to refuse foreign aid is often (far) more
important for a country’s efforts to sustain economic
growth and development than agreeing to accept it.
Two issues are involved. The first is the short-term
economic impacts of the additional expenditure. The
second is the dynamic effects of attempting to
maintain that resource injection for the foreseeable
future. On both counts, Zambia lacks the capacity to
sustain the effort. The economy is seriously
overstretched. Years of budget deficits, and weak (and
often inappropriate) financial, monetary and exchange
rate management produced chronically high rates of
inflation, undercut the economy’s capacity for rapid
economic growth, generated acute aid dependence,
and created major imbalances in the structure of
trade and the balance of payments. Economic
performance has been poor. For example, paid (i.e.
formal sector) employment has declined over most of
the last decade, and the general population has
limited education, poor health and is food insecure.
What would be the dynamic consequences of the
injection of this level of resources into the Zambian
economy? At least five economic effects are likely.
First, inflation would accelerate. With the economy
already having difficulty absorbing existing foreign
assistance and the government running a budget
deficit, additional assistance would boost the money
supply, raising the rate of inflation. Second, the
balance of payments would deteriorate. The resource
inflows would significantly further appreciate the real
exchange rate. This would accentuate Dutch disease,
the effects of which (low economic growth,
increased international debt, rapid growth of imports,
sluggish exports) Zambians have long experienced.
Third, the additional expenditure would crowd out
private sector activity. Wage inflation accompanying
the increased demand for the limited supply of skilled
professionals (teachers, nurses, managers,
administrators, childcare specialists) to provide for
children affected by AIDS would raise unit labour
costs beyond the levels at which the private sector
could remain competitive. Fourth, the economy
would become significantly more aid dependent than
at present and remain that way for the foreseeable
future. Finally, the rate of urbanisation would
accelerate. The overvalued real exchange rate and
higher inflation would accentuate rural poverty
forcing more people to migrate to the cities. Rural
blight and food insecurity would intensify.
Notwithstanding post-2005 increases in copper
prices and the subsequent expansion of mine output,
the country’s economic prospects remain far from
buoyant. The dramatically improved outlook for
mining exports has not boosted economic growth
commensurately, nor has the improved financial
outlook encouraged the government to reduce its
budget and balance of payments deficits.12 The
implication is that Zambia cannot afford to support
the welfare needs of children affected by AIDS even
if the effort were fully funded by the international
community.
Cutting the number of children eligible for support
to 1.5 million, halving the level of assistance provided
each child, or even limiting the support to the
710,000 AIDS orphans would not change that
conclusion. The economy’s limited resource base and
budget and balance of payments deficits do not
provide the scope for large additional outlays
whatever their source.
This outcome is not a legacy of colonialism. Zambia
gained independence in 1964 as the third richest
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country in Africa with minimal levels of external
debt, large budget and balance of payments
surpluses, and a per capita income that was 40 per
cent higher than that of South Korea.13 It is also not
the result of globalisation. The policy changes
announced by the Zambian government at Matero
Hall (1968), Mulungushi Rock (1969), and as part of
the Watershed Speech (1975), defined a trajectory
specifically designed to insulate the economy from
international influences. That approach worked only
too well, progressively impoverishing the majority of
Zambians by excluding them from the benefits of
the expansion in world trade that, among other
things, helped lift most of Asia and Latin America
out of poverty.
Many of Zambia’s difficulties can be traced to a
pattern of partial and failed economic restructuring
and policy-induced distortions that have persisted
since the energy and food crises and the collapse of
copper prices in the 1970s. Nothing has changed in
the government’s present approach to economic
management to suggest this pattern has been
abandoned.
5 But, what if …?
How could Zambia and its donors respond to the
welfare needs of children affected by AIDS? A
constructive response would begin with the
recognition that the main short-term challenge in
Zambia is to provide security (food, healthcare and
shelter) for the affected children while creating
conditions which can provide those children with the
opportunity for an expansive future. For this to
materialise, Zambia needs to restructure its policies
and activities so as to achieve rapid sustained
economic growth.14 That would require taking full
advantage of the country’s assets (agriculture, mining,
tourism, water resources) and drawing as many
members of the country’s labour force as possible
into productive employment. Success would require
the government to shift from its current focus on the
welfare of the roughly 400,000, primarily urban-
based, paid workers and promote policies that
explicitly support the activities and occupations of
poorer members of society – farmers, the informally
employed and small-scale entrepreneurs.
What would such a change in emphasis do for
children affected by AIDS? It would not provide
resources to fully support their welfare needs.
However, it would help boost the agriculture sector
and rural and peri-urban economies, making Zambia
less subject to food insecurity. It would also begin to
generate employment, especially among those with
few skills. That would expand their range of economic
opportunities and encourage higher private spending
on activities that enhance welfare – housing, health
and education. The change would also allow Zambia
to rationalise its relationship with the international
community so that its economic and social policies
could begin to fully reflect local priorities and not
necessarily those that periodically emerge from
Washington, Brussels, Paris and London.15 If
implemented and sustained, the suggested
restructuring would provide the government with the
potential to expand its support for children affected
by AIDS and to the many others in Zambia who are
hungry, illiterate and otherwise deprived.
6 Concluding observations
This analysis of the Zambian case highlights three
points. First, given its present and prospective
economic performance, Zambia lacks the capacity to
support the welfare needs of children affected by
AIDS. The estimated cost is well beyond anything the
Zambian economy could currently afford, or sustain.16
Second, the country cannot begin to create that
capacity until improved economic management
generates and sustains high rates of economic
growth. Third, if constructively supported by the
international community, the government could
begin supplying some of the welfare needs of
children affected by AIDS along with the welfare
needs of other groups who are poor and deprived.
This would require a substantive restructuring of the
government policies and priorities (as reflected in the
budget), including major reductions in non-welfare-
related expenditures.
Emphasising efficiency reminds developing countries
intent on rapidly reducing poverty of the need for
policies and programmes that induce the public and
private sectors to use all available resources in ways
that yield the highest (risk-adjusted) returns. Horizontal
equity requires that all citizens (children, youth and
adults) in similar circumstances be treated similarly.
How, critics will ask, can I emphasise efficiency and
equity when the weight of opinion in the AIDS
community is that the welfare needs of children
affected by AIDS are so overwhelmingly compelling
that governments and donors must meet them? Why
do I refuse to accept that politics and interest group
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pressure trump issues of efficiency and equity? My
position is that without attention to efficiency and
equity and the restrictions they impose on the choices
of governments and donors alike, the economic
growth required to sustain any form of support for
children affected by AIDS will not materialise.
With so few resources available and so few
opportunities to obtain more (except through rapid
sustained economic growth), developing countries
lack the capacities to meet the welfare needs of
children affected by AIDS.17 Those countries,
however, cannot fully meet the welfare needs of all
their citizens who are deprived.18 This is the
unfortunate consequence of being poor. Acting as
though one misfortune can be remedied without
creating others is not a solution.
The welfare needs of children affected by AIDS and
of others who are disadvantaged will be met in
developing countries with generalised AIDS
epidemics through local efforts that improve
economic performance and promote social
development. The international community – donors,
advocates, well-wishers – can assist if they
complement local efforts. Adding more aid when
existing resources are being used inefficiently and
inequitably is a recipe for continued deprivation, not
only for children affected by AIDS but for everyone
else who is poor and deprived.
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Notes
1 Not deciding is not an option. As Lindholm (1959)
noted, when decision-makers dither, the system
‘grinds out’ an outcome, often a poor one.
2 Articles by ActionAid and the Center for Global
Development (www.actionaidusa.org/
imf_africa.php and www.cgdev.org/doc/
IMF/IMF_Report.pdf) criticise the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for what is seen as its
uncompromising attitude to efforts by developing
countries to increase the resources allocated to
‘social spending’. The IMF defended itself
(www.imf.org). Yet, making the IMF (or any other
entity) the villain does not alter the fact that
developing countries have too few resources to
support all the social expenditures that local and
external advocacy groups believe should be made.
3 The data come from UNAIDS (2005); USA.gov
(2007); Dzekedzeke and Fylkesnes (2006).
4 World Bank World Development Indicators 2007,
Table 2.1.
5 The data are from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF 2006). The World Development
Indicators (World Bank 2007, Table 4.2) report a
higher GDP – US$7.3 billion, with an implied
average exchange rate of K4,420 to the US dollar.
6 The Gini coefficient for 2004 was 0.51. The
highest 20 per cent of individuals received 55 per
cent of income while the lowest quintile had 3.6
per cent (World Bank 2007, Table 2.7).
7 These are children ‘… who are living with HIV or
AIDS, those in a family with a member who is
living with HIV or AIDS, and also children affected
by the strains that AIDS places on communities
and services’.
8 This was derived by adjusting the standard of
$2.15/day in 1993 prices to 2005 prices. The price
data were taken from the United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
website (accessed 16 August 2007).
9 Most of these deficits have been large. For
example, from 1998 to 2004 the annual budget
deficit before grants averaged 12.7 per cent of
GDP. After grants, the deficit averaged 6 per cent
of GDP.
10 Since the early 1990s, Zambia has had billions of
dollars of its external debt rescheduled, written
off, written down, or restructured. Its external
debt at the end of 2004 was US$7.08 billion.
11 A widely held view among development
specialists (e.g. Jeffrey Sachs’ End of Poverty, 2005
and the United Nations Millennium Project’s
Investing in Development, 2005) is that scaling-up is
relatively easy or, if difficulties arise, a matter of
political will, or better governance. In reality,
scaling-up has often been the most perplexing
development challenge faced by developing
countries. Indeed, one reason why African
countries continue to have such low per capita
incomes has been their general inability to scale
up the host of activities that have first been
tested/proved at the local level (McPherson
2003).
12 IMF 2006, January, Tables 3,4, pp34–5.
13 South Korea’s GDP in 2005 was approximately
US$788 billion (World Bank 2007, Table 4.2).
14 A programme for reforming Zambia’s economy is
outlined in Hill and McPherson (2004: Chs 15, 17).
15 McPherson in Hill and McPherson (2004: Ch. 14)
proposed an ‘aid exit’ strategy for Zambia as a
means of helping end the country’s acute aid
dependence.
16 If the analysis is applied to sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole, the same conclusion emerges. With GDP
in 2005 of US$662 billion and 332 million
children aged 0–15, the cost of supporting the
welfare needs of (say) 30 per cent of those
children at the international standard of $2/day
would be roughly US$100 billion per year. Since
total government recurrent expenditure in SSA in
2005 was US$120 billion (18 per cent of GDP),
this requirement, like the equivalent calculation
for Zambia, is infeasible.
17 It requires a heart of stone not to be moved by
the suffering caused by HIV/AIDS and the
courage of individuals such as Nkosi Johnson
(Wooten 2004) and whole communities (Epstein
2007: esp. Chs 8, 13). The debate here is not
whether individual or a few children can be
helped but all children who are affected by AIDS.
18 Nicholas Kristof’s characterisation of the deepest
tragedy wrought by poverty is that it forces
individuals to make impossible (Hobson’s) choices
(Kristof 2007) – which child to educate, which
child to put under a bed net at night, which family
member to give medical attention, and so on.
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